Thinking ahead to what NASA would do in of human spaceflight after the Apollo Moon in 1969 the President's Space Task Group, by Vice-President Agnew, offered several scenarios. The Task Group report featured three main options: human expedition to Mars, lunar and Earth-orbiting stations, and a reusable space ferry or President Richard Nixon rejected the first two as too expensive. NASA then decided to for a Shuttle as a building block these other goals, especially the space station. officials reasoned that the Shuttle would be popular with Congress and the White House the other, more expensive options. Nevertheless, in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) NASA's budget, eliminating any growth for the future.

During the development program that soon followed, some simply discounted or ignored predictions of such flight rates as unrealistic. Indeed, some managers that such lofty proclamations were really for consumption or public relations purposes and thus not take them seriously. In retrospect, Robert the Shuttle project manager at NASA's Johnson Center (JSC) said that I never felt d fly more than once a month, 18 flights a year [at the maximum]. if virtually all space payloads were to aboard the Shuttle, Thompson couldn t figure the country would want to do with those flights that were predicted by Mathematica.22 key manager remarked that there was a requirement for 55 flights per year mainly support the economics of the system. In the tail was wagging the dog; instead creating a launch system versatile and rugged to launch often and thus reduce operations some people were artificially creating a launch to justify a particular kind of technology.